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Abstract It is argued that the conjunction effect has a disjunctive analog of strong
interest for the realism–antirealism debate. It is possible that a proper theory is more
confirmed than its (more probable) observational sub-theory and hence than the latter’s
disjunctive equivalent, i.e., the disjunction of all proper theories that are empirically
equivalent to the given one. This is illustrated by a toy model.
Keywords Linda-effect · Conjunction-effect · Disjunction-effect ·
Confirmation · Realism-antirealism debate
1 Introduction
The Linda- or conjunction-effect is a case in which a stronger hypothesis is, though
less probable, more confirmed than a weaker consequence. This is good news for
epistemological realists for they may have the feeling that a theoretical hypothesis,
though less probable than its (strongest) observational sub-hypothesis, can be more
confirmed. The purpose of this paper is to show first, by way of (some variations of) a
toy model, that this is possible in the form of a disjunction effect and second that it is in
these cases by and large a robust effect of all major degrees of confirmation in debate.
The latter is the more impressive the more one subscribes to the view that there is not
one best confirmation language, but that different ones may serve different purposes
beyond some robust features. The former, a toy model, asks of course for real life
scientific examples, preferably including some not only with theoretical properties as
in the toy model, but also with theoretical entities.
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The main part of this paper consists of some formal cases and corresponding toy
examples. The paper concludes with some suggestions for the search of realistic exam-
ples.
2 Some formal cases and corresponding toy examples
2.1 First case
Let hypotheses h1 and h2 be incompatible and let evidence e be such that P(h1 ∧
¬h2 ∧ e) = 1/6 + ε (0 < ε < 1/6) and P(¬h1 ∧ h2 ∧ e) = 1/6 − ε, whereas all
remaining four compatible triples get probability 1/6. See Fig. 1 (Sect. 5) of the paper
by Atkinson (2010) for a useful Venn-diagram, reproduced in adapted form at the
beginning of Appendix 1.
Let f be the disjunctive hypothesis h1 ∨ h2. In an appropriate interpretation, see
the die example below, this may be such that f is the observational sub-hypothesis
(the strongest observational consequence) of h1 as well as of h2, both of which are
assumed to be theoretical. Hence, h1 and h2 are then observationally equivalent (in
the strong, logical sense, that is, whatever the evidence is). Note that f is of course
(a priori as well as a posteriori) more probable than both h1 and h2. Moreover, accord-
ing to the assigned probabilities, p (h1) = 1/3 + ε > p (h2) = 1/3 − ε .
Let ‘B-confirmation’ be short for confirmation according to Bayesian confirmation
(c-)measures, that is, c-measures that have c(h, e) > 0 for (probabilistic) confirmation,
i.e. p (h|e) > p (h), c(h, e) < 0 for disconfirmation (p (h|e) < p (h)) and c(h, e) = 0
for neutral evidence (p (h|e) = p (h)) . All 10 c-measures considered in this paper,
that is, the 9 measures dealt with in Atkinson et al. (2009, see pp. 4–5 for a list of
them, see also Appendix 1) and the new (confirmation cum justification) measure put
forward by Shogenji (2010), viz. J(h, e) = 1−[log p(h|e)/log p(h)], are Bayesian.
Claim 1 e B-confirms h1 more than f, to which it is B-neutral. Moreover, e B-discon-
firms h2. That is, c (h1, e) > c (f, e) = 0 > c (h2, e) holds for all Bayesian c-mea-
sures.
Proof we only need to prove: p (h1|e) > p (h1), p (f|e) = p (f), and p (h2|e) < p (h2).
These three claims are easy to prove.
Assuming the occasional defensibility of the observable and theoretical status of the
hypotheses, respectively, we may conclude that e B-confirms theoretical hypothe-
sis h1 more than its disjunctive observational sub-hypothesis f, which on its turn is
B-confirmed more than theoretical hypothesis h2. Hence, by transitivity, e B-con-
firms theoretical hypothesis h1 more than its observationally equivalent theoretical
hypothesis h2. The following die example realizes the type of hypotheses suggested.
Example Let a die be loaded in favor of (face) 6 and in equal disfavor of 4. It is fair
with respect to 1, 2, 3, and 5. Let h1 correspond to the outcome 1 or 6, and h2 to the
outcome 3 or 4 (and h3 to the outcome 5 or 2). In sum, let there be ε(0 < ε < 1/6) such
that p (6) = 1/6+ ε, p (4) = 1/6− ε, and p(1) = p(2) = p(3) = p(5) = 1/6. However,
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let the faces 1, 3, 4, 6 not be directly observable but hidden by stickers. On the faces
1 and 3 the sticker is telling 1v3 and on the faces 4 and 6 it tells 4v6.
Note that f now corresponds to the observable outcome 1v3v4v6. Note also that out-
comes even/odd remain observable, despite the stickers. On the other hand, the out-
comes h1 and h2 are non-observable, they are observationally equivalent, by both
having f as their disjunctive observable sub-hypothesis. In a table, in which * indi-
cates being observable, we get:
h1 h2 f* h3*
Odd* 1 3 (1 or 3)* 5*
Even* 6 4 (4 or 6)* 2*
In this example we obtain that an (observable) even outcome B-confirms theoretical
hypothesis h1, B-disconfirms theoretical hypothesis h2, and is B-neutral with respect
to the disjunctive observable sub-hypothesis f of both.
2.2 Second case
Let h1, h2, f and e be as before, but now such that P(h1 ∧ ¬h2 ∧ e) = z > 1/6,
whereas all remaining five compatible triples have equal probability, hence (1− z)/5,
which is smaller than 1/6. In terms of the die example we get: p(6) = z > 1/6,
p(1) = p(2) = p(3) = p(4) = p(5) = (1 − z)/5 = df u (<1/6). Hence, the die is loaded
in favor of 6 and in equally spread disfavor of all other five faces.
Claim 2.1 e B-confirms h1 and f and e B-disconfirms h2. That is, min{c(h1, e), c(f,
e)} > 0 > c(h2, e)} holds for all Bayesian c-measures.
Claim 2.2 e confirms h1 more than f according to all 9 measures treated in Atkinson
et al. (2009), except Z(h,e). That is, c(h1, e) > c(f, e) holds for all these measures,
except for Z(h, e), in which case Z(h1, e) = Z(f, e) > 0. Moreover, it holds for Sho-
gengji’s J-measure.
Proof The first claim is easy to prove. The (analytical) proofs of the second claim
with respect to the 9 measures are given in Appendix 1. So far, I did not succeed in
finding an analytical proof for the J-measure. However, David Atkinson provided a
‘graphic proof’, see Appendix 2.
In this example we obtain that an (observable) even outcome confirms, according to all
but one of the measures considered, theoretical hypothesis h1 more than its disjunctive
observable sub-hypothesis f.
2.3 Third case
Let h1, h2, f and e be as before, but now such that for some ε, 0 < ε < 1/6, P(h1 ∧
¬h2 ∧ e) = 1/6 + ε, P(¬h1 ∧ ¬h2 ∧ ¬e) = 1/6 − ε, whereas all remaining four
compatible triples have equal probability, i.e. 1/6. In terms of the die example we get:
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p (6) = 1/6 + ε, p (5) = 1/6 − ε, and p (1) = p (2) = p (3) = p (4) = 1/6 and
p(1) = p(2) = p(3) = p(4) = 1/6. Hence, the die is loaded in favor of 6, in disfavor of
5, and fair with respect to the other outcomes. Now we get a claim which is as easy to
prove as claim 1.
Claim 3 e B-confirms h1, while it B-disconfirms f as well as h2. That is, c(h1, e) > 0
> max{c(f, e), c(h2, e)} holds for all Bayesian c-measures.
Hence, e confirms theoretical hypothesis h1 more than its disjunctive observational
sub-hypothesis f and its observationally equivalent h2. To some extent it is hence a
variant of the first example. In that example the disfavor was put on h2, and hence
‘balanced’ in the disjunction h1vh2. Now the disfavor is put on h3.
3 Concluding remarks
As suggested in the introduction, the fact that a stronger hypothesis can be (robustly)
more confirmed than a weaker consequence is very interesting for scientific realists.
It suggests that a theory can be more confirmed than its observational sub-theory.
Assuming that confirmation of a theory deals with the question whether it is true or
false, this is grist to their mill. Take Mendel’s theory. It is in principle possible that
the evidence of the transmission of observable features in successive generations of
organisms can be such that it confirms the full theory of Mendel, with its theoretical
entities and properties, more than the conjunction of all observational regularities it
implies. Similarly for all other ‘proper theories’, that is, theories with genuine theoret-
ical terms in addition to terms that are not laden with those theories themselves (See
Kuipers 2001, for the theory-relative distinction). The strange thing is that so far I did
not succeed in finding claims of this kind in the realism–antirealism debate (Kuipers,
to appear).
Additional questions arise when we look at this possibility from the point of view
that within a given language any observational theory can be seen as the disjunction
of all empirically equivalent (EE-)theories that have the former as their observational
sub-theory. Is it possible that more than one of the EE-theories is confirmed more than
that sub-theory? If so, the interesting question becomes crucial which one of them is
confirmed most. However, none of the three toy examples represents such a situation.
Moreover, so far the relevant notions are all taken in the deductive sense, that is,
theories are empirically equivalent when they have the same observational deduc-
tive consequences and the observational sub-theory of a theory is the conjunction of
all its observational deductive consequences. What happens with these notions when
probabilistic consequences (Kuipers 2009) are taken into account is as such already an
interesting question, let alone how confirmation of the relevant theories then is related.
Finally, the toy examples in this paper are rather artificial. The hypotheses and
hence their prior values do not resemble very much genuine scientific hypotheses and
their priors, there are no theoretical entity terms involved, and the theoretical prop-
erties are indeed very artificial. However, the toy examples do nevertheless illustrate
the principled possibility of scientific cases in which a proper theory is robustly more
confirmed than its observational sub-theory.
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Appendix 1: Proof of claim 2.2 with respect to the 9 measures
in Atkinson et al. (2009)
We follow the list on pp. 4–5, except that the Z-measure is treated at the end, and start
each time with the relevant definition.
To be proven for the remaining 8 measures: c(h1, e) > c(f, e)
Recall: P(h1 ∧ ¬h2 ∧ e) = z > 1/6, whereas all remaining five compatible triples
have equal probability, hence (1 − z)/5. Let u be (1 − z)/5. Hence, z = 1 − 5u, and
u < z. In a figure adapted from Atkinson (2010, Fig. 1, Sect. 5), with the faces of the





f=h1vh2 z0=0 x=0 y0=(2)=u
h2
y2=(3)=u           z1=(4)=u  
In these variables we have: z0 = x = 0, z2df = z > 1/6, z1 = y0 = y1 = y2 =
x∗ = (1 − z)/5 =df u.
C (h, e) =df P(h ∧ e) − P (h) P (e)
Hence,
C (h1, e) = z − (z + u) (z + 2u) > z + u − (z + 3u) (z + 2u) = C (f, e)?
2u (z + 2u) > u?
2z + 4u > 1?
2z + 4u > z + 5u = 1 OK
Reminder 1: 2z + 4u > 1
D (h, e) =df P (h|e) − P (h)
Hence,
D (h1, e) = z/ (z + 2u) − (z + u) > (z + u) / (z + 2u) − (z + 3u) = D (f, e)?
2u > u/ (z + 2u)?
2 > 1/ (z + 2u)?
2z + 4u > 1 OK (Reminder 1)
S (h, e) =df P (h|e) − P(h|¬e)
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Hence,
S (h1, e) = z/ (z + 2u) − u/3u > (z + u) / (z + 2u) − 2u/3u = S (f, e)?
1/3 > u/ (z + 2u)
z + 2u > 3u
z > u (OK)
P.M. Z(h, e), see below
R (h, e) =df log [P (h|e) /P (h)] = log [P (e|h) /P (e)] (assuming non-zero proba-
bilities for P(h) and P(e))
R-comparison amounts to r (h, e)
(=df P (e|h) /P (e)
)
-comparison, hence P (e|h)-
comparison.
Hence,
P (e|h1) = z/ (z + u) > (z + u) / (z + 3u) = P (e|f)?
z (z + 3u) > (z + u) (z + u)?
3zu > 2zu + uu?
z > u (OK)
Reminder 2: z (z + 3u) > (z + u) (z + u)
L (h, e) =df log [P (e|h) /P(e|¬h)]
L-comparison amounts to [P(e|h)/P(e|¬h)]-comparison.
Hence,
P (e|h1) /P(e|¬h1) = [z/ (z + u)] / [2u/4u ]>] (z + u) / (z + 3u)] / [u/2u]
= P (e|f) /P(e|¬f)?z (z + 3u) > (z + u) (z + u) OK (Reminder 2)
N (h, e) =df P (e|h) − P(e|¬h)
Hence,
N (h1, e) = z/ (z + u) − 1/2 > (z + u) / (z + 3u) − 1/2 = N (f, e)?
z(z + 3u) > (z + u) (z + u) OK (Reminder 2)
K (h, e) =df [P (e|h) − P(e|¬h) ]/[ P (e|h) + P(e|¬h)]
Hence, since P(e|¬h1) = 1/2 = P(e|¬f), the comparison of K (h1, e) > K (f, e)? is
of the form
(a − 1/2)/ (a + 1/2) > (b − 1/2)/ (b + 1/2)
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which holds iff a >b, and hence, the question is:
P (e|h1) > P (e|f) OK (see, the R-, that is, r-comparison)
F (h, e) =df [P (h|e) − P(h|¬e) ]/[ P (h|e) + P(h|¬e)]
Hence,
F (h1, e) = [z/ (z + 2u) − 1/3] / [z/ (z + 2u) + 1/3]
> [(z + u) / (z + 2u) − 2/3 ]/[ (z + u) / (z + 2u) + 2/3] = F (f, e)?
[3z − (z + 2u)] / [3z + (z + 2u)]
> [(z + u) − 2 (z + 2u)] / [(z + u) + 2 (z + 2u)]?
(2z + 2u)/(4z + 2u) > 0 > (−z − 3u)/(3z + 5u)OK
Z (h, e) =df [P (h|e) − P (h)]/P(¬h) if P (h|e) ≥ P (h)
Z (h, e) =df [P (h|e) − P (h)]/P (h) if P (h|e) < P (h)
Hence, Z(h, e) depends on whether h1, resp. f is confirmed by e; in general amounting
to the question p(h|e) ≥ p(h) or, equivalently, p(h|e) ≥ p(h|¬e).
P (h1|e) = z/ (z + 2u) > u/3u = 1/3 = p(h1|¬e)?
3z > z + 2uOK
P (f|e) = (z + u) / (z + 2u) > 2u/3u = 2/3 = p(f|¬e)
3z + 3u > 2z + 4u OK
Hence, since both are confirmed, the question is:
Z (h1, e) = [P (h1|e) − P (h1)]/P(¬h1) > [P (f|e) − P (f)]/P(¬f)?
[P (h1|e) − P (h1)] > 2 [P (f|e) − P (f)]? (since P(¬h1) = 4u = 2P(¬f))
[z/ (z + 2u)] − (z + u) > 2{[(z + u) / (z + 2u)] − (z + 3u)}?
[z/ (z + 2u)] − (z + u) > (2z + 2u) / (z + 2u)] − (2z + 6u)?
1 = z + 5u > (z + 2u) / (z + 2u) = 1?No
Conclusion: equal confirmation according to Z!
Appendix 2: Proof of claim 2 with respect to Shogenji’s J-measure
(with special thanks to David Atkinson)
J (h, e) =df 1 − [log p (h|e)) /log p (h)]
For the given values z0 = x = 0 and z1 = y0 = y1 = y2 = x*=u and z2 = 1 − 5u,
the question is:
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J(h1, e) = 1 − [log(1 − 5u) − log(1 − 3u)]/log(1 − 4u)
> 1 − [log(1 − 4u) − log(1 − 3u)]/log(1 − 2u) = J (h1vh2, e)?
The allowed range is 0 < u < 1/6, corresponding to 1/6 < z2 < 1. In the follow-
ing graph (obtained by the program Mathematica) we see J(h1, e) (solid curve) and
J(h1v h2, e) (dashed curve)
From these curves it can be seen that J(h1, e) > J(h1v h2, e) for 0< u < 1/6. The
difference, J(h1, e)− J(h1v h2, e), is shown in the following, even more telling, curve:
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